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Various features of the design of the new ‘High Income Child
Benefit charge’ look problematic
Robert Joyce examines the problematic implications of linking Child Benefit with income.
Those earning between £50,000 and £60,000 will effectively have a higher marginal tax
rate. It also creates complexity and incoherence in the welfare system and thus it is
unclear whether the net effect of all this will be to improve the welfare system.
Today, Child Benef it will ef f ectively become an income-related benef it f or the f irst t ime,
reducing public spending by an estimated £1.5 billion in 2013–14. We estimate that
about 820,000 f amilies, in which at least one adult has a taxable income exceeding
£60,000 per year, stand to lose all their Child Benef it via a new income tax charge unless they change
their behaviour in response. And about 320,000 f amilies in which the highest- income adult is on between
£50,000 and £60,000 would have some, but not all, of  it clawed back. The af f ected f amilies stand to lose
an average of  about £1,300 per year. The remaining 85% of  f amilies currently receiving Child Benef it will
be unaf f ected f or now, although more will be af f ected in t ime because the £50,000 threshold is planned
to be f rozen in cash terms.
In the context of  a large f iscal consolidation, one can understand why the government is looking at
universal benef its going to those on higher incomes as one candidate f or cutbacks. But various f eatures
of  the design of  this particular policy look problematic.
First, much attention has understandably f ocused on inequities of  treatment between 1-earner and 2-
earner f amilies. The means test uses inf ormation only on the taxable income of  the highest- income
f amily member so, f or example, a 2-earner couple with taxable income of  £100,000 split equally between
them would retain all Child Benef it, but a 1-earner couple or lone parent with taxable income of  £60,000
would lose all of  it. This kind of  situation does not arise with existing means-tested welf are payments,
which are based upon f amily income. (But note that, because a f amily’s Child Benef it entit lement will
depend upon the income of  the highest- income individual, this is not simply an argument about f amily
versus individual assessment: this policy is an unusual hybrid of  the two.)
A second unusual f eature of  the ref orm relates to its impact on incentives f or individuals to reduce their
taxable income by, f or example, working less or contributing more to a private pension. All f amilies’ Child
Benef it entit lements will be exhausted once the taxable income of  the highest- income adult reaches a
f ixed level – £60,000 – regardless of  how much Child Benef it has to be withdrawn. To achieve this, the
rate at which it is withdrawn as income rises above £50,000 has to vary with the number of  children in the
f amily, i.e. with the amount of  Child Benef it the f amily receives. Specif ically, af f ected taxpayers will pay
back one per cent of  their f amily’s Child Benef it f or every £100 by which taxable income exceeds
£50,000. One per cent of  Child Benef it is £10.56 per year f or a 1-child f amily, and an additional £6.97 per
child f or larger f amilies. Hence the marginal tax rate between £50,000 and £60,000 is increased by about
11 percentage points f or the f irst child and by an additional 7 percentage points f or each subsequent
one. So, f or example, while about 320,000 people will f ind that their marginal income tax rate increases to
more than 50%, about 40,000 of  them – those with three or more children – will f ind that it jumps to at
least 65%. This is illustrated by the Figure, which shows marginal income tax rates f or taxpayers with
dif f erent numbers of  children.
Figure: Marginal income tax rates in 2013-14 for the highest-income member of families with
children
Source: Author ’s calculations.
This unusual f eature of  the policy has another consequence in the long run. Since higher Child Benef it
entit lements imply higher withdrawal rates, marginal tax rates between £50,000 and £60,000 will also
have to rise over t ime as cash-terms Child Benef it rates rise in line with prices (or indeed in line with
anything else). This may sound obscure and technical, but in t ime it would be important. For example,
indexation of  Child Benef it rates at 2% per year would increase these marginal rates by a f urther 5
percentage points f or a 3-child f amily over one decade. To avoid this, some f amilies with an adult on
more than £60,000 would have to be allowed to retain some of  their Child Benef it. But there are currently
no provisions to do this: the £60,000 withdrawal end-point is not a parameter that is planned to be
uprated over t ime.
That is an important detail, but the government could and should address it without any structural
upheaval. Other problems are more f undamental to the design of  the policy. It creates a series of
administrative complexit ies, including the need f or up to 500,000 more individuals to f ill in income tax
self -assessment f orms according to HMRC. But perhaps the biggest concern is the incoherence it
creates in the welf are system. We already have the Child Tax Credit, and soon its imminent replacement,
namely the child additions within Universal Credit. The ref orm to Child Benef it will mean that we have two
systems of  income-related support f or children. But the relationship to income will be completely
dif f erent in each case: based on f amily income in one case and the income of  the highest- income f amily
member in the other; withdrawn at dif f erent rates as income rises; and with the withdrawal starting at
very dif f erent income levels.
With the introduction of  Universal Credit, the government will integrate six of  the seven existing means-
tested benef its and tax credits into one. IFS researchers have argued that the basic principles behind this
move have much to commend them. But almost simultaneously, the government is introducing a new and
separate means test f or Child Benef it which will work in a completely dif f erent way, as well as making the
seventh existing means-tested benef it – Council Tax Benef it – much more complicated by asking every
Local Authority in England to design its own scheme. It is unclear whether the net ef f ect of  all this will be
to improve the welf are system.
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1. The government should abolish Child Benef it and increase the Child Tax Credit f or poorer f amilies,
saving billions. (40.8)
2. Universal Credit may reinf orce the tradit ional ‘male breadwinner ’ model and af f ect many women’s
access to an income (20)
3. Calls to cut bureaucracy in benef it provision may actually work to prevent access to benef its f or
those that need them the most. (19.8)
4. National Insurance is complex and pointless and should be merged with income tax. (19.7)
